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Abstract. Given a cloud-based anonymous data storage system, there are two 
ways for managing the nodes involved in file transfers. One of them is using 
reputations and the other uses a micropayment system. In reputation-based 
approach, each node has a reputation associated with it, which is used as a 
currency or feedback collection for file exchange operations. There have been 
several attempts over the years to develop a strong and efficient reputation 
system that provides credibility, fairness, and accountability. One such attempt 
was the Free Haven Project that provides a strong foundation for cloud-based 
anonymous data storage systems. The work proposed in this paper is motivated 
by the Free Haven Project aimed at developing a reputation system that 
facilitates dynamic operations such as adding servers, removing servers and 
changing role of authorities. The proposed system also provides algorithm for 
scoring and maintaining reputations of the servers in order to achieve 
credibility, accountability and fairness.  
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1  Introduction 
Cloud-based data storage systems have gained popularity in recent years. 
Cloud storage involves storing large volumes of data on multiple servers 
(virtual or physical), which has several advantages over traditional data 
storage [1], [2]. Although cloud storage provides greater flexibility of 
accessing data on demand basis from anywhere – anytime, cloud storage 
services facilitate more importance on persistence of storage rather than 
accessibility. Based on nature of applications, cloud data access can provide 
an interesting feature like anonymous data storage and access as well. An 
anonymous data storage system was proposed in [3], known as The Free 
Haven Project, with a design based on a collection of servers called the 
servnet. In Free Haven Project, each server is identified with a pseudonym 
rather than some external identifying information like an IP address. Servers 
hold pieces of some documents, termed as shares, and exchange these shares 
in order to promote server anonymity, i.e., no document can be linked back to 
a server. For further discussion on the various kinds of anonymity provided in 
the Free Haven design, one can refer to [3] for more on this. The Free Haven 
design provides a basic framework upon which an efficient reputation system 
can be built which provides credibility, fairness and accountability. 
 
Accountability is the ability to link an action or a set of actions to the node 
that is responsible for certain deliverables on time. In any distributed system, 
providing accountability is a challenging task. Moreover, in a system that is 
as committed to anonymity as Free Haven, accountability becomes even more 
challenging. This is because any action by an entity in an anonymous system 
may be linked to a pseudonymous identity. This pseudonymous identity will 
most certainly not help establishing any concrete identification of the entity 
carrying out the actions. The goal of accountability is to maximize a server’s 
effectiveness to the overall system while minimizing its potential (known and 
plausible) threat [4]. 
 
There are two approaches to tackle this problem of minimizing the threat 
and ensuring accountability. One approach is to limit the risk to an amount 
roughly equivalent to the benefit from the transaction. This is the basic 
principle followed by micro-payment schemes. The other approach is to make 
the risk proportional to the trust in the other parties. This forms the base for 
any reputation system, in which servers are given an incentive to earn 
reputation by following the protocol, whereas misbehaving leads to a decline 
in reputation which detriments the server’s chances of obtaining services of 
its peers. Reputations are used extensively in electronic marketplaces to gauge 
the reliability of online users. The most popular examples of online 
marketplaces that utilize such reputation systems are eBay and Amazon. A 
reputation system also consists of scoring algorithms. For example: Any user 
on eBay can give his counterpart a score of {1, 0, -1} after the transaction. 
The votes collected by eBay are then used to provide cumulative rating of the 
user which is made available to all online users. The Free Haven Project 
provides a strong foundation for reputation system. However, it lacks 
accountability. Furthermore, the scoring algorithms of servers are also not 
well-defined.  
We propose a reputation system that successfully provides accountability. 
The proposed scoring algorithm ensures credibility and fairness. Local scores 
provided by peers are utilized to model cumulative global reputation. The 
reputation system leverages the use of authorities to eliminate feedback 
broadcasts. The system also introduces a contract protocol to be used before 
the shares trade. A new feedback mechanism is introduced that prevents 
cheating by the involved parties. The proposed reputation system provides 
both theoretical foundation and adequate cryptographic safeguards to 
supplement a Free Haven-like anonymous data storage system.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines 
some existing work on reputation systems for peer to peer networks. Section 3 
presents our scheme. Section 4 analyzes the proposed scheme. We conclude 
the paper in Section 5. 
 
 
2 Related Works 
Two popular reputation-based systems, CONFIDANT [5] and CORE [6], 
are designed in such a way that each node is aware of the reputation of every 
other node in the network. The feedback in CONFIDANT is based on 
reputation table broadcasts, which is a limitation in terms of performance. 
CORE on the other hand, has an indirect mechanism, that is, by observing the 
positive recommendation about other nodes. As mentioned earlier, The Free 
Haven Project [3] makes an attempt to design a reputation system for their 
architecture, where some set of ideas have been discussed, but no concrete 
protocols have been introduced. 
 
Aberer and Despotovik [7] provide a formal analysis of reputation and trust in 
the context of peer to peer networks. Their approach is based on P-Grid, a 
decentralized storage method. The probability that an agent will cheat in the 
future is assessed using the information provided by P-Grid. The proposed 
system in Section 3 can handle agents having high probability of cheating.  
 
3 The Proposed Scheme 
We propose reputation algebra for a semi-centralized anonymous data 
storage system for cloud. The servers trade files with each other to gain 
reputation. The reputation algebra is divided into six phases: Initial Setup, 
Registration, Transaction, Scoring and Reputation Algorithms, Revocation of 
a server, and Change in Authority.  
 
3.1 Basic Architecture  
The proposed system has a flat-architecture as opposed to a hierarchical 
one. Nodes and the leaf servers are logically connected to each other. The root 
servers are authorities that maintain reputations of all leaf servers assigned to 
them. Both authorities and leaf servers participate in file trading. The 
authorities change dynamically after periodic timeouts. The reason for 
periodic timeouts is mentioned later. Consequently, a leaf server is promoted 
to the role of an authority if its reputation satisfies required criteria. There is a 
database, which can be accessed by all the authorities, containing information 
about the node, its global reputation and its authority. 
 
3.2    Role of Authority 
The root servers in the servnet architecture are called the authorities. 
Authorities are chosen so that they have the highest reputation relative to all 
leaf servers assigned to it. The servnet consists of several interconnected tree-
like structures with each sub-tree consisting of an authority and its leaf 
servers. Since the server having the highest reputation in the sub-tree is 
chosen as the authority, authorities keep changing. Authorities trade files like 
leaf servers but also maintain reputations of all the leaf servers connected to 
them. The reputations are stored in a database and a key is generated on-the-
fly by the authority for encryption of the data to be stored in database. This 
ensures that only the authority can access the database. 
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Figure 1. Servnet Architecture 
 
The notation used in the scheme is given in Table 1. 
 
Symbol  Meaning 
AuthX   Authority of an entity, say X  
AuthAll   All authorities 
PkX   Public key of X 
NX   Nonce of X 
signx   X’s signature 
signAuthC   Chosen Authority’s signature 
KX   Secret key of X 
SSX   Size of  the  share  X 
DX   Duration  for  which  X  needs  to store the file 
NANB   Transaction   ID 
{M}K   M is encrypted by key K 
Table 1. Notation used in the scheme 
3.3  The Scheme 
The phases of the scheme are as follows: 
 
Initial Setup. The system is deployed with each server assigning score 0 as 
the initial reputation. The authorities for initial deployment are chosen 
randomly. 
 
Registration. Any server entering to the system needs to register with an 
authority. The new server is attached as a leaf to an authority. It is assigned 0 
as an initial global reputation. The server is identified using a pseudonym and 
its public key. Both these parameters along with an acknowledgement of the 
authority-server connection are flooded to each authority in the servnet. This 
enables each authority to construct a node-authority table. 
 
The registration phase works as follows: 
 
1. A → AuthC : A, PKA, {A, PKA, NA}SignA 
2. AuthC  → A : {NA+1}PkA 
3. AuthC  → AuthAll : {A, PKA, {A, PKA, NA}signA}signAuthC 
 
Here, A indicates a new server and AuthC indicates chosen authority. 
 
Transaction. The transaction phase comprises of the Contract Establishment 
Protocol and the Feedback Protocol. 
  
The Contract. Each party sends a message containing the proposed file size 
and duration for which it is to be stored. If the conditions are agreeable to 
both, they proceed with the file trade. The Contract Establishment Protocol is 
shown in Figure 2. Here, A and B are considered as new servers. 
 
1.   A → B : A, SSA, DA, B, NA   
2.   B → AuthB : B, (A, NB’) 
3.   AuthB → AuthA : AuthB, {B, A, NAuthB}SignAuthB 
4.   AuthA → B : AuthA, {A, GRA}SignAuthA 
5a.  B → A: B, Reject, NA+1 
5b.  B → A: B, SSB, DB, A, NB 
6.   A → AuthA : A, (B, NA’) 
7.   AuthA  → AuthB : AuthA, {A, B, NAuthA}SignAuthA 
8.   AuthB  → A : AuthB, {B, GRB}SignAuthB 
9a.  A → B : A, Reject, NB+1 
9b.  A → B : A, Ack, NB+1 
10.  A → B: {Hash (Messages 1, 5, 9)}SignA 
11.  B → A: {Hash (Messages 1, 5, 9, 10)}SignB 
 
Figure 2. Contract Establishment Protocol 
 
 
Contract Establishment Protocol Explanation. A sends the request for a share 
trade with B in message 1. The parameters for the trade i.e. Share size and 
Duration are sent as SSX and DX in the message. In steps 2, 3, 4, B queries its 
authority for A’s cumulative global reputation. After step 4 is complete, B has 
all the information it needs to make a decision on whether to accept or reject 
A’s trade request.  
B sends a “Reject” or its own parameters in message 5 (5a or 5b). If a 
“Reject” is sent, the protocol ends. In message 6, A queries its authority for 
B’s cumulative global reputation. This allows A to make a decision to either 
accept or reject the trade based on B’s parameters received in message 5. 
Again, A either sends a “Reject” or an “Ack” based on its decision. The final 
two messages ensure that A and B have agreed upon the same parameters that 
were exchanged in the messages. Once A receives message 10, it extracts the 
hash and compares it with hash of its own set of message 1, 5 and 9 (9a or 
9b). If the check fails, protocol is aborted. The same procedure is carried out 
by B with messages 1, 5, 9 and 10 after receiving message 11. 
 
Feedback. After every completed transaction, each party sends a mandatory 
feedback giving a local score of the other transacting party using the 
Feedback protocol defined below. 
A gives a local score (LS) to B using the Feedback protocol as follows: 
 
FeedbackA = A, {NANB, LSB, A}SignA                             
 
1. A → B: FeedbackA   
2. A → AuthB: FeedbackA   
3. B → AuthB: FeedbackA  
 
Similarly B gives a local score to A                                       
FeedbackB = B, {NANB, LSA, B}SignB 
 
1. B → A: FeedbackB  
2. B → AuthA: FeedbackB  
3. A → AuthA: FeedbackB  
 
Feedback Message Explanation. Feedback message contains A’s identity so 
that the signature can be verified. The signed part contains NANB i.e. the 
Transaction ID, local score for B given by A and the identity of A. The identity 
of A is added so that no other server can send a feedback for B. 
 
Feedback Protocol Explanation.   A sends its feedback through two paths, 
which are as follows. 
 
1. A → B → AuthB  
2. A → AuthB  
 
Since the feedback passes through B, it can extract LSB and know when A 
gives a false score. Also, B cannot modify its score because A’s signature on 
the message cannot be generated. Further reasons are provided in the security 
analysis of the Feedback Protocol in Section 4. 
 
Scoring Algorithm. The scores maintained by an authority is the cumulative 
global reputation of a server. One of the ingredients to derive the cumulative 
global reputation is the local score provided in the feedback message at the 
end of each transaction. The other ingredient is the global reputation of the 
server that is providing the local score. The local score can be either 1 or -1 
based on the result of the transaction. The total cumulative global reputation 
(GR) of a server is defined as: 
GR = T * (POS) / (NEG + 1)  -------------------------- (1) 
where, 
POS = ∑ (PSX  * GRX)  -------------------------------------- (2) 
NEG = ∑ (NSX  * GRX)  
 
The global reputations of A and B are derived in the following manner after 
the feedback is received: 
GRA  = (NA  + 1) * (POSA) / (NEGA + 1*GRB  + 1)  
GRB  = (NB  + 1) * (POSB + 1*GRA) / (NEGB  + 1)  
 
As mentioned earlier, the three major properties that need to be satisfied by 
the reputation system are accountability, credibility and fairness. Below we 
show that the proposed scoring algorithms ensure accountability, credibility, 
fairness. 
 
Accountability. Accountability is inherently provided with the reputation 
system. Any peer that misbehaves will be caught and a negative point will be 
sent to the authority thereby reducing its reputation. Reduced reputation 
decreases its chances of making further transactions. Therefore, a 
misbehaving server cannot sustain itself in the system. 
 
Credibility. The credibility of a server is dependent on its global reputation. 
Higher global reputation implies higher credibility. This ensures that a new 
server cannot degrade the reputation of an existing server by giving negative 
scores. 
 
In  (2)  and  (3)  positive  and  negative  local  scores  by a  server  X  are  
multiplied  with global reputation of X, i.e., the weight of X’s score depends 
on the global reputation of X. For example, a negative score by a low-
reputation server does not cost the other party much; however, a positive score 
by a high-reputation server carries a lot more weight. 
 
Fairness. Consider a server which is performing consistently and has lower 
number of transactions as compared to a relatively inconsistent performer 
with higher number of transactions. Fairness ensures that after a certain 
number of transactions, the consistent performer has a higher global 
reputation than the inconsistent server. Let there be two peers, peer 1 and peer 
2. Let T1 and T2 be the number of transactions by peer 1 and peer 2, 
respectively in a particular time frame. Also let peer1 receive a negative score 
after every m1 transactions and m2 be the number of transactions after which 
peer 2 receives a negative score. The condition for which peer 1’s reputation 
is greater than peer 2’s reputation is as follows: 
 
We want GR1  > GR2   
 
T1  * T1(m1-1) / m1*(T1/m1+1) > T2  * T2(m2-1) / m2*(T2/m2+1)  
T1  * T1(m1-1) / (T1+m1) > T2  * T2(m2-1) / (T2+m2)   
Let k = T2  * T2(m2-1) / (T2+m2)  
T1
2
(m1-1) > kT1  + m1 k   
T1
2
(m1-1)   -kT1  - m1k > 0  
 
Solving for T1, 
T1  > (T2(m2-1)/T2+m2  ± (k
2
+4(m1-1)m1k)
1/2
)/2(m1-1)  
 
If the above condition is satisfied, the reputation of peer 1 is greater than that 
of peer 2, else the reputation of peer 2 is greater than that of peer 1. 
 
We use (1) to calculate the cumulative global reputation of each peer using the 
parameters mentioned in the Table 2.
 
Parameters Peer 1 Peer 2 
No. of transactions T1 T2 
No. of transactions after which a negative 
score is Received 
m1 m2 
Current Negative Score T1/m1 T2/m2 
Current Positive Score T1(m1-1)/m1 T2(m2-1)/m2 
Table 2. Formulas for peer 1 and peer 2 
 
Revocation of a server. The server before leaving the servnet transfers the 
data that is part of a contract to its respective owners and the remaining data is 
transferred to its authority. The reputation for the server is set to 0 and all 
other authorities are notified. 
 
Change of Authorities. After a certain timeout, a mandatory mechanism to 
change the authority is invoked. When the timeout occurs, there will be a 
change in authority under the following circumstances: 
 
a) The global reputation of the contender is higher than the global 
reputation of the current authority.   
b) Global reputation of the contender is higher than some factor of the 
global reputation of the current authority. For example: Let that factor 
be 1/2. Therefore, if  
(Global reputation of contender)>1/2*(Global reputation of current authority)  
 
the contender will be appointed as the new authority. The factor may vary 
according to owner policies.  
 
If the conditions a) and b) are not satisfied then the current authority 
continues to be the authority and it will remain as authority till any of the 
above two conditions are satisfied.  
If an authority change does take place, the old authority loses access whereas 
the new authority gains access to the database server. Also, the database is 
updated to reflect the authority change. Each node attached to the old 
authority is notified of the authority change. The following Authority Change 
Protocol is used to generate a new key to access the database server. This is 
carried out in such a way that the old authority is denied access to the 
database. 
 
1. AuthOld → DB Server: {B, A, NA}KDBA 
2. DB Server→AuthNew: DBServer,{{KNew, B, NDB}SignDB}KB,{AuthNew, AuthOld, NDB}SignDB 
3. AuthNew → DB Server: {NDB  + 1}KNew 
 
Each leaf server attached to the old authority is notified about the change in 
authority by sending the following message. 
 
DBServer, (AuthNew, AuthOld, NDB)SignDB 
 
The terms in this message can be found in message 2 of the Authority Change 
Protocol. Also, this message cannot be generated by any authority on its own 
due to DB server’s signature. The Authority Change Protocol is run when an 
authority leaves the servnet. 
 
 
4   Analysis of the Scheme 
This section contains security and performance analysis of the proposed 
scheme. 
 
4.1    Contract Establishment Protocol 
Impersonation. A malicious party may attempt to impersonate another peer to 
establish a contract using the proposed protocol. The impersonating party may 
deliberately fail to fulfill the contract conditions. This results in a negative 
feedback for the impersonated peer. In the proposed protocol (Figure 2), all 
the fields in the message A, TSA, SSA, DA, B, NA can be generated by the 
attacker but the signatures in messages 10 and 11 cannot be generated. 
Therefore, the impersonation attack fails. 
 
Man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM). An adversary between A and B can 
modify SSA and DA in the first message or SSB and DB in the second message 
in such a way that the peer on the other end of the transaction will not agree 
with them. In the proposed protocol, even if such a change is made by 
generating custom values of share (SS), the adversary cannot generate the 
correct hashes sent in messages 10 and 11. Without the correct hashes, the 
hash checking on both ends fail. Hence MITM is prevented. 
 
Replay attack. Replay attacks require the fraudulent transmission of valid 
transmission data. In our protocol (Figure 2), the presence of nonce in 
messages 1 through 9 prevents them from being replayed without being 
detected. Messages 10 and 11 are just signed hashes of messages (1, 5 and 9) 
and (1, 5, 9 and 10) respectively. Replaying messages 10 and 11 will not be 
fruitful because the hash checking at each end will fail. 
 
4.2    The Feedback Protocol 
Impersonation. A peer may impersonate another peer to give a false score to 
its contracting party. In the proposed protocol, the impersonating party cannot 
generate the signature over the term (NANB, LSB, A)signA even though the 
individual terms can be calculated. Hence impersonation attack fails. 
 
Party giving the score cannot cheat. As the protocol suggests, A gives a 
feedback for B throughout two distinct paths. A sends the feedback message 
to B who then forwards it to his authority. A also sends the feedback message 
directly to B’s authority. In the first path, B can check whether A has given a 
false score. Also, if A gives a positive score in the feedback message sent to B 
and a negative score in the feedback message directly sent to B’s authority, 
the discrepancy can be detected. Since A signs both feedback messages, the 
authority can know that A is cheating. 
 
Party receiving the score cannot cheat. Suppose B receives a negative score 
from A and decides to drop the feedback message, i.e., not forward the 
feedback message to its authority. Since A sends a feedback message to B’s 
authority directly as well, this problem can be resolved. Therefore, B cannot 
cheat. 
 
 
4.3 Authority Change Protocol 
Impersonation. A normal peer cannot impersonate an authority during the run 
of the “Change in Authority” protocol. This is because the first message (B, 
A, NA) is encrypted using KDBA which is known only to the old authority and 
the database server. A normal peer or an authority cannot generate the 
signature. Furthermore, the last message {NDB + 1}KNew ensures that the new 
authority knows the correct key. 
 
 
5    Conclusion 
We proposed a scheme for reputation system built atop the Free Haven 
framework for anonymous cloud data storage system. Our scheme provides 
dynamic operation such as adding servers into the system, removing servers 
from the system, establishing trade contracts between two parties, feedback 
mechanism for exchanging local trust scores and changing authorities after 
mandatory timeout. The proposed scoring algorithm provides accountability, 
credibility and fairness, which are the most important attributes of any 
reputation system. The analysis of sub-protocols shows that the proposed 
scheme is secure against known and plausible threats. 
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